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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
            
  
          
      
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 This case is before this court on appeal from an order 
of the district court granting summary judgment on all counts to 
the appellees in this antitrust action brought against them by 
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the Massachusetts School of Law at Andover, Inc. (“MSL”).  The 
district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337, 
and this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  This 
appeal principally presents a number of questions regarding the 
scope of immunities from the antitrust laws and related antitrust 
discovery issues.  An examination of the parties and conduct in 
question is first necessary. 
 
 I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 A.  The Parties 
 MSL has been operating a law school in Massachusetts 
since 1988.  The Board of Regents of Massachusetts authorized MSL 
to grant the J.D. degree in 1990.  This authority allowed MSL's 
graduates to take several bar examinations, including that in 
Massachusetts.  MSL has the stated policy of providing low-cost 
but high quality legal education and attracting mid-life, working 
class, and minority students.  MSL facilitates this policy with 
its admissions procedure and a tuition of $9,000 per year.  Many 
of MSL's policies and practices conflict with American Bar 
Association ("ABA") accreditation standards, and MSL aggressively 
has sought changes in those standards.  
 The ABA, a national professional organization of 
attorneys whose membership is open to members of any bar in the 
United States, has been concerned with legal education and bar 
admissions throughout its history.  In 1921, through its Section 
of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar (the “Section”), the 
ABA first developed standards of accreditation for legal 
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education programs.  The ABA petitioned state supreme courts to 
rely on its accreditation decisions in connection with bar 
admission decisions.  Now, all 50 states and the District of 
Columbia consider graduation from an ABA-accredited law school 
sufficient for the legal education requirement of bar admission. 
 App. at 1396-1409.  The United States Secretary of Education 
considers the Council of the Section to be the national agency 
for accreditation of professional schools of law and a reliable 
authority concerning the quality of legal education.  App. at 
3378.  The ABA informs the states of its accreditation decisions 
and annually sends them the Review of Legal Education in the 
United States, the ABA accreditation standards, and any proposed 
revisions of the standards.  During the period at issue, there 
were 177 ABA-accredited law schools in the United States and over 
50 unaccredited schools with some form of state approval such as 
MSL enjoys.  The ABA consistently has opposed attempts to change 
or waive bar admission rules to allow graduates of schools not 
accredited by the ABA to take the bar examination.  See, e.g., 
app. at 3623-53. 
 Many states have methods of satisfying the legal 
education requirement other than graduation from an ABA-
accredited school.  These methods include legal apprenticeship, 
practice in another state, and graduation from a school approved 
by the American Association of Law Schools (“AALS”) or a state 
agency.  The AALS is an association of 160 law schools which 
serves as a learned society for law schools and legal faculty and 
as a representative of the law school community with the federal 
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government and other education organizations.  Furthermore, in 
every state, a bar applicant or law school can petition the bar 
admission authority for revision or waiver of the rules.  MSL won 
a waiver of New Hampshire's rules to allow its graduates to take 
the bar in 1995, and has filed petitions seeking similar relief 
in Connecticut, Maine, New York, and Rhode Island.  Maryland and 
Washington, D.C. have granted petitions of graduates of MSL to 
take the bar.  MSL graduates can take the bar examination 
immediately after graduation in California, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, Vermont and West Virginia, and in 12 other states 
after practicing in another state first.   
 The ABA allows graduates of non-accredited schools to 
join the ABA once they are admitted to a bar and does not 
prohibit its members from hiring or otherwise dealing with 
graduates of such schools.  The ABA does not prevent its members 
from teaching at non-ABA-accredited schools, but it does not 
allow its accredited schools to let students transfer credits 
from unaccredited schools or to accept graduates of unaccredited 
schools into graduate programs.   
 ABA accreditation is open to any law school that 
applies and meets the ABA standards.  The ABA grants provisional 
accreditation to schools that substantially comply with its 
standards and promise to comply fully within three years.  An 
Accreditation Committee makes an initial evaluation of a school 
for provisional accreditation and gives a recommendation to the 
Council of the Section.  The Council then makes a recommendation 
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to the ABA House of Delegates, which has the ultimate decision-
making authority.   
 A law school must have been teaching students for five 
years and graduated three classes to be eligible for AALS 
membership.  The AALS holds an annual meeting, professional 
conferences and workshops,1 and publishes the Journal of Legal 
Education.  All of its current members are ABA-accredited, but 
accreditation is neither necessary nor sufficient for membership 
approval.  The AALS accredits schools in the sense that it 
determines whether a school meets its membership requirements, 
but it has accreditation standards and procedures separate from 
those of the ABA.  The AALS conducts a site visit, independently 
of the ABA, when a school applies for membership, and it conducts 
periodic visits after membership, usually jointly with the ABA if 
the school is ABA-accredited.  The AALS is not involved with site 
inspections for provisional ABA accreditation, such as the one 
the ABA undertook at MSL.   
 The Law School Admissions Council, Inc. (“LSAC”) is the 
successor organization to the Law School Admission Council and 
Law School Admission Services, Inc.  The LSAC, as have its 
predecessors, administers the Law School Admissions Test 
(“LSAT”).  The LSAC is not affiliated formally with either the 
ABA or the AALS and does not participate in the ABA accreditation 
process.  Membership in the LSAC is open to any United States law 
                     
      1.     The AALS does not prohibit non-members from 
attending these conferences, and representatives of MSL have 
attended them, even though MSL is not a member and never has 
applied for membership.  App. at 2279-80. 
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school that (1) requires that “substantially all of its 
applicants for admission take the Law School Admission Test,” and 
(2) is ABA-accredited or an AALS member.  App. at 2552.  MSL does 
not require the LSAT, never has applied for AALS membership, and 
is not ABA-accredited, so thus is not eligible for LSAC 
membership. 
 In addition to administering the LSAT, the LSAC 
performs a number of other services.  The Candidate Referral 
Service (“CRS”) provides lists of names and addresses of people 
who have taken the LSAT.  Use of the CRS is open to any school 
which has degree granting authority from a state, regardless of 
LSAC membership or ABA accreditation, and MSL has made use of 
this service.  App. at 2410-12, 2511-12, 2427-29.  The Law School 
Data Assembly Service (“LSDAS”) provides a summary of a law 
school applicant's college record and LSAT score.  LSDAS is also 
open to all schools and has been used by MSL.  App. at 2410-12.  
The LSAC publishes a handbook, The Official Guide to U.S. Law 
Schools, with a two-page description of each United States LSAC 
member school, and two appendices with the names and addresses of 
Canadian LSAC members and unaccredited United States law schools, 
including MSL, known to the LSAC.  The LSAC also sponsors 
regional recruiting forums for law school applicants and 
conferences of pre-law advisors which are only open to LSAC 
members.  
 B.  The Complaint 
 MSL applied for provisional ABA accreditation during 
the fall of 1992 and early 1993.  MSL never claimed it was or 
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would be in compliance with ABA standards, but instead asked for 
a waiver under Standard 802 which allows the Council to grant 
variances from the standards.  Following the established process, 
a seven-member site evaluation team appointed by and representing 
only the ABA visited MSL and then prepared a 76-page report which 
was sent to MSL.  MSL sent a 90-page response to the site team 
report.   
 The Accreditation Committee, after reviewing the site 
report and the MSL materials, and hearing a presentation from six 
MSL representatives, recommended denial of MSL's accreditation 
application because it did not meet the ABA requirements.  The 
Committee also recommended denial of the waiver request.  In a 
letter to MSL explaining its denial recommendation, the Committee 
listed 11 areas where MSL failed to comply with ABA standards.  
App. at 837-48.  These areas included the high student/faculty 
ratio, over reliance on part-time faculty, the heavy teaching 
load of full-time faculty, the lack of adequate sabbaticals for 
faculty, the use of a for-credit bar review class, the failure to 
limit the hours students may be employed, and the failure to use 
the LSAT or give evidence validating its own admission test.2  
App. at 845-46.  The body of the letter discussed the inadequacy 
of MSL's law library, but the letter did not cite that inadequacy 
as one of the reasons for the denial recommendation.  App. at 
842-43; see app. at 845-46.  The letter did not discuss the 
                     
     2.     MSL challenged all these standards, as well as 
standards on faculty salaries and law libraries, in its antitrust 
complaint. 
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salaries of MSL's faculty.  Invoking ABA procedures, MSL appealed 
but, after a full review at which MSL had the opportunity to make 
a presentation, the denial of accreditation was upheld on 
February 8, 1994.   
 MSL filed this action on November 23, 1993, alleging 
that the ABA, AALS, LSAC, and 22 individuals combined and 
conspired to organize and enforce a group boycott in violation of 
section 1 of the Sherman Act and conspired to monopolize legal 
education, law school accreditation, and the licensing of 
lawyers, in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.  15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1-2.  The complaint basically alleged that the appellees 
conspired to enforce the ABA's anticompetitive accreditation 
standards by:  (1) fixing the price of faculty salaries; (2) 
requiring reduced teaching hours and non-teaching duties; (3) 
requiring paid sabbaticals; (4) forcing the hiring of more 
professors in order to lower student/faculty ratios; (5) limiting 
the use of adjunct professors; (6) prohibiting the use of 
required or for-credit bar review courses; (7) forcing schools to 
limit the number of hours students could work; (8) prohibiting 
ABA-accredited schools from accepting credit transfers from 
unaccredited schools and from enrolling graduates of unaccredited 
schools in graduate programs; (9) requiring more expensive and 
elaborate physical and library facilities; and (10) requiring 
schools to use the LSAT.3  MSL alleged that enforcement of these 
                     
     3.     MSL alleges that a self-interested cabal of legal 
educators who enforce the allegedly anti-competitive criteria to 
their own advantage has "captured" the ABA accreditation process. 
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anticompetitive criteria led to the denial of its application for 
provisional accreditation and caused MSL to suffer a “loss of 
prestige” and direct economic damage in the form of declining 
enrollments4 and tuition revenue.   
 After MSL filed its complaint, the Antitrust Division 
of the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) began an 
investigation of the ABA's accreditation process and on June 27, 
1995, filed suit against the ABA in the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia alleging violations of section 
1 of the Sherman Act.  The ABA entered into a consent decree with 
the DOJ on June 25, 1996, settling that case.   
 After a period of discovery under Rule of Reason 
standards, the district court granted the appellees summary 
judgment on both counts.  The court held MSL did not suffer a 
cognizable antitrust injury; any disadvantage it incurred was 
attributable to the decision by the individual states to preclude 
graduates of unaccredited schools from taking bar examinations, 
and such injury “cannot be the basis for antitrust liability” 
under Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 
Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 81 S.Ct. 523 (1961).  Massachusetts School of 
Law v. American Bar Ass'n, 937 F. Supp. 435, 441 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
 The court also held that to the extent that the unaccredited 
status creates a stigma which injures MSL, Noerr precludes 
recovery for the injury because it is “incidental to the primary, 
                     
     4.     MSL says that its entering classes are now only 40% 
of what they were before the denial of accreditation.  MSL br. at 
4. 
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protected injury resulting from governmental decisions to 
preclude MSL graduates from taking certain bar examinations.”  
Id. at 442.  In the alternative, the court held that even if the 
stigmatic injury were not incidental to Noerr-protected conduct, 
the claim still would fail because the ABA has done nothing more 
than express its opinion, which is speech protected by the First 
Amendment, and not conduct for which there can be antitrust 
liability.  Id. at 442-46. 
 MSL appeals from the order for summary judgment and a 
number of prior orders related to discovery, the dismissal of the 
individual appellees for lack of personal jurisdiction, the 
denial of a motion to recuse Judge Ditter, and the 
disqualification of MSL's inside counsel.  The DOJ has filed an 
amicus brief arguing that the district court erred in holding 
that any stigmatic injury from non-accredited status was 
incidental to a Noerr-protected injury to the extent that there 
was no actual petitioning of government in this case.  The DOJ 
also argues that the district court erred in holding that the 
First Amendment immunizes anticompetitive effects brought about 
through speech.  
 
 II.  DISCUSSION 
 A.  Standard of Review 
 We review a district court order granting summary 
judgment de novo both as to factual and legal questions.  Mathews 
v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 87 F.3d 624, 632 (3d Cir. 1996); 
Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 
  
 
 13 
F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir. 1993).  We review discovery orders under 
an abuse of discretion standard.  Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville 
Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987); Marroquin-Manriquez v. 
INS, 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983).  As germane here, MSL has 
to show that the district court's denial of discovery “made it 
impossible to obtain crucial evidence, and implicit in such a 
showing is proof that more diligent discovery was impossible.”   
In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 818 (3d Cir. 
1982) (citation omitted).  We review the district court's denial 
of the motion for recusal for abuse of discretion.  Blanche Road 
Corp. v. Bensalem Township, 57 F.3d 253, 265 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 116 S.Ct. 303 (1995); United States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 
568, 573 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 B.  Discovery Issues  
 1. Price Fixing  
 MSL argues that a district court order of May 20, 1994, 
which held that the ABA standards were not price fixing and per 
se unlawful and that discovery would proceed under a Rule of 
Reason analysis, MSL, 853 F. Supp. 837 (E.D. Pa. 1994), is 
contrary to law and should be reversed.  MSL contends that the 
district court held in this order that “the ABA had not fixed 
prices,” and that that holding is contrary to settled law.  MSL 
br. at 40.  This argument mischaracterizes the district court's 
holding.  As the district court correctly noted, ABA Standard 
405(a) (considering faculty salaries as part of school's ability 
to attract and retain quality faculty) is somewhat vague.  
Although not dispositive, the lack of a specific price floor or 
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ceiling suggests that the standard represents something other 
than a classic price-fixing arrangement.  MSL, 853 F. Supp. at 
840.  The court, however, did say that the standard was “price-
affecting,” which in many cases is sufficient for a per se 
approach.  Id.  See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 
U.S. 150, 221-24, 60 S.Ct. 811, 843-46 (1940).   
 The court properly then went on to consider the context 
of the case.  In this regard, it is significant that the ABA is a 
professional society and the Supreme Court has indicated that it 
has “been slow to condemn rules adopted by professional societies 
as unreasonable per se,” even when the behavior resembles conduct 
usually subject to a per se approach.  FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of 
Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458, 106 S.Ct. 2009, 2018 (1986) (Rule of 
Reason approach even though behavior resembled group boycott); 
see also National Soc'y of Prof. Eng. v. United States, 435 U.S. 
679, 692-94, 98 S.Ct. 1355, 1365-66 (1978) (using Rule of Reason 
analysis even though agreement affected prices); Goldfarb v. 
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 n.17, 95 S.Ct. 2004, 2013 
n.17 (1975) (distinguishing between practice of professions and 
other business activities); United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 
658, 672 (3d Cir. 1993) (Rule of Reason approach used even though 
behavior resembled price fixing).   
 MSL nevertheless argues that the price fixing aspect of 
the ABA standards has infected the entire conspiracy, justifying 
a per se approach, and that the Supreme Court has discouraged 
finding new exceptions to the per se standard.  See FTC v. 
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 428-31, 110 
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S.Ct. 768, 778-79 (1990).  We, however, do not apply a new 
exception to the per se approach here.  Rather, the use of the 
Rule of Reason is appropriate here because where “a conspiracy of 
this sort is alleged in the context of a profession, the nature 
and extent of [the] anticompetitive effect are too uncertain to 
be amenable to per se treatment.”  Wilk v. American Medical 
Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207, 221 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 MSL also appeals the district court's July 20, 1994 
discovery order which held that MSL had not been injured by the 
alleged price fixing, and therefore denied discovery as to the 
faculty salary standard except insofar as it related to MSL's 
accreditation application.  MSL, 857 F. Supp. 455 (E.D. Pa. 
1994).  Contrary to MSL's argument, this order did not hold as a 
final matter that the alleged salary fixing had no impact on MSL. 
 It merely stated that "the evidence presently at hand does not 
support MSL's contention that one of the reasons the ABA declined 
to accredit MSL was noncompliance with the salary standard[].”  
Id. at 458.  The court allowed MSL to continue discovery to 
ascertain whether salary was a factor in accreditation denial, 
but barred broader discovery as to the development and 
implementation of that standard.   
 MSL did find evidence that the ABA had data on its 
salaries (collected as part of general fact-finding about the 
school) and evidence that the ABA had warned other schools about 
low salaries.  Nevertheless, MSL is not able to point to any 
evidence, or draw a reasonable inference, that the ABA actually 
used salary as a factor in denying MSL's accreditation or that 
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the ABA's stated reasons for denying it accreditation were 
pretextual.  In fact, the evidence and inferences point the other 
way, demonstrating that the ABA explicitly states low salaries as 
a factor when it is one.  Thus, we cannot find that the district 
court's limitation of discovery in this manner was an abuse of 
discretion. 
 2.   Conspiracy 
 MSL argues that the district court denied it the 
discovery necessary to prove its allegations of conspiracy.  MSL 
complains generally about the lack of usefulness of the materials 
it did receive during discovery, but largely confines its 
argument to the materials the ABA turned over to the DOJ, some 
544,000 pages.  MSL cites a number of cases, including Golden 
Quality Ice Cream Co. v. Deerfield Speciality Papers, Inc., 87 
F.R.D. 53 (E.D. Pa. 1980), for the proposition that civil 
antitrust plaintiffs can obtain discovery of documents produced 
for government antitrust cases.  Br. at 37.  In these cases, 
however, the government case had begun before the civil case, and 
the civil plaintiffs sought copies of the material given to the 
government at the outset of discovery in their cases.  See Golden 
Quality, 87 F.R.D. at 59.5   
 In the present case, the government's investigation 
began after MSL's, and MSL sought all of the documents given to 
                     
     5.     Further, these cases involved requests to stay the 
civil proceedings until the completion of the government 
investigation.  See, e.g., Golden Quality, 87 F.R.D. at 55.  Of 
course, we recognize that the government's case against the ABA 
was civil but we are using civil to mean a non-governmental case. 
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the government after the court set the confines of discovery in 
MSL's case.  Thus, the district court held in an order dated 
August 6, 1996, that a request for all documents given to the 
government was an attempt “to do an end run around” the existing 
discovery framework.  The court found that MSL could have 
obtained all those documents which were relevant through the 
existing discovery framework.  See Board of Educ. of Evanston 
Township v. Admiral Heating and Ventilation, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 
600, 603-04 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (denying complete turnover of all 
materials collected by grand jury investigation).  Given the 
context of this case, the court did not abuse its discretion in 
this ruling. 
 MSL also argues that it was not given sufficient 
opportunity to conduct discovery to withstand the appellees' 
summary judgment motion.  MSL cites several cases for the 
proposition that granting summary judgment before the opposing 
party has had sufficient opportunity for discovery can be 
reversible error.  See, e.g., Arnold Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. General 
Motors Corp., 786 F.2d 564, 568 (3d Cir. 1986); Mannington Mills, 
Inc. v. Congoleum Indus., Inc., 610 F.2d 1059, 1073 (3d Cir. 
1979).  Br. at 4.  These cases are in tension with another line 
of cases which encourages the use of summary judgment in order to 
avoid burdensome litigation expenses when the allegations are 
theoretical or speculative.  See, e.g., Pennsylvania ex. rel. 
Zimmerman v. Pepsico, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 182 (3d Cir. 1988); 
Pennsylvania Dental Ass'n v. Medical Serv. Ass’n, 745 F.2d 248, 
262 (3d Cir. 1984).  While the present case fits neither paradigm 
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exactly, the district court, by allowing fairly extensive 
discovery and then closing discovery and entertaining the summary 
judgment motion, did not abuse its discretion. 
 C.  Summary Judgment 
 MSL asserts three types of injury resulting from the 
ABA's allegedly anticompetitive conduct.  The first is that MSL 
is at a competitive disadvantage in recruiting students because 
graduates of unaccredited schools cannot take the bar examination 
in most states.  Second, MSL says that denial of accreditation 
creates a stigma, independent of the bar examination issue.  
Finally, MSL contends that the ABA's enforcement of its 
accreditation standards injures it directly by increasing the 
cost of faculty salaries and creating a boycott of unaccredited 
schools. 
 In granting summary judgment to the appellees, the 
district court held that they were not subject to antitrust 
liability for MSL's principal alleged injury, a competitive 
disadvantage in recruiting students, to the extent that the 
decisions of the individual states to prohibit graduates of 
unaccredited schools from taking their bar examinations caused 
the injury.  MSL, 937 F. Supp. at 441.  The court based this 
holding on the principles of Noerr, 365 U.S. 127, 81 S.Ct. 523.  
MSL argues on appeal that the Noerr principles do not apply here 
because private anti-competitive conduct is immunized only where 
it is (1) clearly and affirmatively authorized by state policy, 
and (2) actively supervised by the state.  California Retail 
Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105, 
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100 S.Ct. 937, 943 (1980).  See also FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 
504 U.S. 621, 112 S.Ct. 2169 (1992); Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 
94, 108 S.Ct. 1658 (1988).  The DOJ, in its amicus brief, does 
not challenge this aspect of the district court's holding. 
 In Parker v. Brown the Supreme Court held that the 
Sherman Act does not prohibit an anticompetitive restraint 
imposed by a state as an act of government.  317 U.S. 341, 352, 
63 S.Ct. 307, 314 (1943).  The decision in Noerr reaffirmed the 
Parker doctrine in stating “where a restraint upon trade or 
monopolization is the result of valid governmental action, as 
opposed to private action, no violation of the Act can be made 
out.”  365 U.S. at 136, 81 S.Ct. at 529.  Noerr went on to hold 
that any attempt to petition or influence the government to 
impose an anticompetitive restraint is immune from antitrust 
action.6  Id.  Further, even if the anticompetitive restraint 
results directly from private action, it is still immune if it is 
an “incidental effect” of a legitimate attempt to influence 
governmental action.  Id. at 143-44, 81 S.Ct. at 533.  As the 
Supreme Court put it, “Parker and Noerr are complementary 
expressions of the principle that the antitrust laws regulate 
business, not politics; the former decision protects the States' 
acts of governing, and the latter the citizens' participation in 
government.”  City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 
                     
     6.     Noerr dealt specifically with legislative lobbying, 
but its principles were applied to cover attempts to influence 
the executive and judicial branches in United Mine Workers v. 
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 85 S.Ct. 1585 (1965), and California 
Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 92 S.Ct. 
609 (1972). 
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499 U.S. 365, 383, 111 S.Ct. 1344, 1355 (1991).  Thus, the 
initial substantive issues on this appeal are whether state or 
private conduct caused the injury MSL alleges it suffered because 
its graduates could not take the bar examination in most states, 
and whether, if MSL suffered an injury as a result of the ABA's 
conduct, the injury was an incidental effect of the ABA's attempt 
to influence the states with respect to establishing criteria for 
bar admission.  We will discuss each alleged injury separately. 
 1. Injury from bar examination requirements 
 Each state retains the authority to decide what 
applicants may take its bar examination and may be admitted to 
the bar.7  Accordingly, MSL's argument that the ABA received 
“carte-blanche delegated authority to decide who can take bar 
exams,” MSL reply br. at 19, is simply wrong.  See cases cited 
supra note 7.  Many, but not all, states consider the 
accreditation decisions of the ABA in their legal education 
requirement (one of many requirements) for taking the bar 
examination.  Yet, every state retains the final authority to set 
                     
     7.     See, e.g., Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 569, 104 
S.Ct. 1989, 1996 (1984) (“Pursuant to the State Constitution the 
Arizona Supreme Court has plenary authority to determine 
admissions to the bar.”); In re Murphy, 393 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 
1978) (bar admission “exercised [] exclusively by the Supreme 
Court”); In re Hansen, 275 N.W.2d 790, 796 (Minn. 1978) (“We have 
not delegated our authority to the ABA but, instead, have simply 
made a rational decision to follow the standards of educational 
excellence it has developed.”); Potter v. New Jersey Supreme 
Court, 403 F. Supp. 1036, 1040 (D.N.J. 1975) (State's adoption of 
“the standards of an approving body does not support a conclusion 
that such adoption is an abrogation or delegation of the power or 
duty to supervise the practice of law in this State pursuant to 
the mandate of the State Constitution.”), aff’d, 546 F.2d 418 (3d 
Cir. 1976). 
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all the bar admission rules, and individual applicants or law 
schools can petition the states for waivers or changes.   
 To the extent that MSL's alleged injury arises from the 
inability of its graduates to take the bar examination in most 
states, the injury is the result of state action and thus is 
immune from antitrust action under the doctrine of Parker v. 
Brown, 317 U.S. at 352, 63 S.Ct. at 314.  The ABA does not  
decide who can take the bar examinations.  Rather, it makes an 
accreditation decision which it conveys to the states, but the 
states make the decisions as to bar admissions.  Without state 
action, the ABA's accreditation decisions would not affect state 
bar admissions requirements.  Because the states are sovereign in 
imposing the bar admission requirements, the clear articulation 
and active supervision requirements urged by MSL are 
inapplicable.  See Quinn v. Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 
1226, 1240 (D. Del. 1985).  In short, this case does not involve 
a delegation of state authority.  To the contrary, the states use 
the ABA to assist them in their decision-making processes.  Thus, 
we have here a government action case. 
 Our holding is consistent with current antitrust 
jurisprudence.  The Supreme Court held in a challenge to 
Arizona's bar admissions policies that the conduct in question 
"was in reality that of the Arizona Supreme Court," and thus 
immune under Parker.  Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 573-74, 104 
S.Ct. 1989, 1998 (1984).  Further, the Supreme Court has held 
that when a state supreme court adopts a state bar rule banning 
legal advertising, and retains final enforcement authority over 
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it, Parker immunity applies.  Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 
U.S. 350, 361, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 2697 (1977) (“The Arizona Supreme 
Court is the real party in interest; it adopted the rules, and it 
is the ultimate trier of fact and law in the enforcement 
process.”). This case is entirely analogous.  The states do not 
adopt the ABA's accreditation processes, but they do adopt and 
give effect to the results.8  Thus, the cases cited by MSL 
(Midcal, Patrick, ant Ticor) are inapplicable because they dealt 
with situations where private parties were engaging in conduct, 
whether price-fixing (Midcal and Ticor) or denying hospital 
privileges (Patrick), which led directly to the alleged antitrust 
injury.  Here, the state action setting the bar examination 
requirements led to the alleged injury.9 
 Our holding is also consistent with several court of 
appeals and district court decisions applying the principles of 
Noerr.  In Lawline v. American Bar Ass’n, 956 F.2d 1378 (7th Cir. 
1992), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held under 
Noerr that the ABA could not be held liable for any antitrust 
injury resulting from the Illinois Supreme Court's adoption of 
ethical standards developed and promulgated by the ABA.  Id. at 
                     
     8.     The Supreme Court opinion in Allied Tube & Conduit 
Corp. v. Indian head, Inc, 486 U.S. 492, 108 S.Ct. 1931 (1988), 
is also consistent with our holding because it specifically 
excluded from consideration any injury resulting from the 
adoption of the challenged standards by any government and dealt 
only with the independent marketplace effect of the defendant's 
conduct.  Id. at 500, 108 S.Ct. at 1937. 
     9.     In its reply brief, MSL continues to miss the crucial 
point that it is the direct action of the states which causes its 
injury and continues to discuss cases where private conduct 
caused the alleged antitrust injury.  MSL reply br. at 11-15. 
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1383.  Similarly, in Sessions Tank Liners, Inc. v. Joor Mfg., 
Inc., 17 F.3d 295, 299 (9th Cir. 1994), the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant which convinced a private 
association to produce a code that was adopted by or relied upon 
by a number of municipalities, and that injured the plaintiff, 
was immune from antitrust liability because the “injuries for 
which [plaintiff] seeks recovery flowed directly from government 
action.”10  Id. at 299.  These cases cannot be distinguished 
effectively from this case.   
 In another analogous case, an organization that 
accredited chiropractic schools was held immune from Sherman Act 
liability for denying a school's accreditation because of a 
dispute over educational philosophy, when the alleged injury 
resulted from state decisions to deny licenses to graduates of 
unaccredited schools and from the effects of lobbying in favor of 
those state decisions.  Sherman College of Straight Chiropractic 
v. American Chiropractic Ass’n, 654 F. Supp. 716, 722-23 (N.D. 
Ga. 1986), aff'd, 813 F.2d 349 (11th Cir. 1987).  See also 
Zavaletta v. American Bar Ass'n, 721 F. Supp. 96 (E.D. Va. 1989) 
(dismissing suit by students at unaccredited law school because 
of Noerr immunity).  In these circumstances, MSL's claim that the 
ABA's conduct injured it because its graduates cannot take the 
bar examination in most states fails. 
 2. Stigma injury 
                     
     10.     In Sessions, the injury resulted from the denial of 
permits, while here the injury is from the prohibition precluding 
applicants from taking bar examinations in many states. 
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 MSL also alleges that independent of any bar 
examination requirements, it was injured by the stigmatic effect 
in the market place of the denial of accreditation.   MSL claims 
that the ABA has conducted a campaign to convey the idea that ABA 
accreditation is the sine qua non of quality and that the ABA is 
the most, or only, competent organization to judge law schools.  
There is enough evidence to create a genuine dispute of material 
fact on this issue.  See app. at 2105-09, 3570-72.  Nevertheless, 
the district court ruled that this injury could not form the 
basis for antitrust liability because it was “incidental to the 
primary, protected injury,” and thus immune under Noerr.  MSL, 
937 F. Supp. at 442.  MSL challenges this holding on the grounds 
that there was no petitioning of government here, and therefore 
Noerr does not apply.  The DOJ as amicus challenges the holding 
to the extent it finds petitioning unnecessary for immunity for 
stigma injury, but takes no position on whether any petitioning 
took place.  We hold that there was sufficient petitioning to 
invoke Noerr immunity.11 
 MSL relies extensively on the Supreme Court's decision 
in Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc, 486 U.S. 492, 
                     
     11.     In its reply brief, MSL seriously misstates the 
Noerr doctrine, arguing that only "successful petitioning of 
courts to clearly and affirmatively authorize . . . closely 
supervise, review and approve" the ABA's conduct would provide 
immunity.  MSL reply br. at 19.  Under Noerr, any solicitation of 
government action is immune, whether or not it is successful.  
This mischaracterization stems from MSL's continued inability to 
recognize that there is state action at issue here, not private 
conduct. 
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108 S.Ct. 1931 (1988).12  In Allied Tube, a producer of 
electrical conduit sought approval of its product from the 
National Fire Protection Association for inclusion of the product 
in the Association's National Electrical Code.  A substantial 
number of state and local governments adopted the code virtually 
without change.  To be included in the code, all that was 
required was a majority vote of the members present at the annual 
meeting of the Association.  To prevent approval of the 
electrical conduit at question in the case, competitors of the 
producer stacked the annual meeting with persons who pledged to 
vote against approval.  On the facts in Allied Tube the Court 
held that the code developed by the defendants had a force in the 
marketplace independent of any government adoption (or 
petitioning for such adoption) in that there was a conspiracy 
among manufacturers, distributors, and consumers not to trade in 
products not approved by the code.  486 U.S. at 503, 507, 108 
S.Ct. at 1938-40.   Further, the Court held that the application 
of Noerr immunity depends “on the context and nature of the . . . 
activity,” and found the challenged conduct to be “the type of 
commercial activity that has traditionally had its validity 
determined by the antitrust laws.”  486 U.S. at 504-05, 108 S.Ct. 
at 1939.  That was so, the Court reasoned, because the activity 
                     
     12.     MSL's additional reliance on American Soc'y of 
Mechanical Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 102 
S.Ct. 1935 (1982), is misplaced because that case dealt with 
agency and apparent authority issues and does not consider Parker 
or Noerr immunity.  It also dealt with an attempt to interfere 
directly with a company's customers, 456 U.S. at 562, 102 S.Ct. 
at 1940, an exception to Noerr inapplicable here. 
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of which the producer complained involved the dubious commercial 
practices of economically interested actors that had an impact on 
the political process; it was not political activity that had an 
impact on commerce.   
 The conduct of which MSL complains here is basically 
the ABA's justification of its accreditation decisions and MSL is 
asserting a loss of prestige resulting from it.  This conduct is 
neither normal commercial activity nor the type of restraint of 
trade involved in Allied Tube, and thus that case is not 
controlling.  A loss of prestige resulting from a refusal to 
approve a product or service does not alone make out an antitrust 
claim.  See Schachar v. American Academy of Ophthalmology, Inc., 
870 F.2d 397, 399 (7th Cir. 1989); Consolidated Metal Prods., 
Inc. v. American Petroleum Inst., 846 F.2d 284, 293 (5th Cir. 
1988). 
 Noerr immunity is proper in this case because the ABA 
engaged in petitioning activity, and the stigma injury which MSL 
suffered was incidental to that activity.13  MSL admits that in 
the past, “from the 1920's to approximately the mid 1970's,” the 
ABA petitioned the states in a campaign to prohibit graduates 
from unaccredited schools from taking bar examinations.  See MSL 
br. at 16.  This campaign was obviously successful as now most 
states require graduation from an ABA-accredited school for 
admission to the bar.  The ABA's current conduct surely would be 
considered petitioning if it took place during the past campaign. 
                     
     13.     There is no “conspiracy” exception to either Noerr 
or Parker immunity.  Omni, 499 U.S. at 383, 111 S.Ct. at 1355. 
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 The fact that the ABA was successful in lobbying the states does 
not weaken its position.  The ABA continues to communicate its 
accreditation decisions to the states, and it desires that they 
continue to give them credence.  Discussing the quality and 
competence of its decisions is a legitimate, although somewhat 
indirect, way of petitioning the states to continue to follow its 
guidance.  Yet, such activity is no more indirect than the public 
relations campaign held to be petitioning in Noerr.  365 U.S. at 
140-41, 81 S.Ct. at 531. 
 There is an exception to Noerr immunity that would 
apply if the ABA “attempted directly to persuade anyone not to 
deal with” MSL.  See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 142, 81 S.Ct. at 532.  
There is no evidence that the ABA made such an attempt (there was 
such evidence in Allied Tube), nor is there any other evidence 
suggesting that Noerr immunity should not apply here.  In a 
supplemental filing of information after oral argument, MSL 
produced two instances where it claims the ABA directly mentioned 
MSL.  The first is a Boston Globe article about the denial of 
accreditation to MSL in which an ABA governor defended the ABA 
standards as providing “a minimum level of quality and consumer 
protection assurance to the public.”  John H. Kennedy, “Andover 
Law School Loses Appeal for Accreditation,” Boston Globe, 
February 9, 1994, at 42.  The second proffered piece of evidence 
is a transcript of the ABA House of Delegates debate of MSL's 
accreditation application, where one member urged the denial of 
MSL's application and stated that the standards with which MSL 
did not comply “lie at the heart of a quality institution.”   
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 Both of these statements do nothing more than defend 
the ABA standards.  As we discuss above, this is valid, if 
indirect, petitioning activity.  The ABA is not saying directly 
that MSL is a bad institution, or that a particular student 
should not go there.  MSL's attempts to characterize all the 
ABA's comments about the quality of its accreditation process as 
direct attacks on MSL does not make them direct attacks.  We also 
point out that if a claim for stigma injury could be advanced in 
circumstances like those here, Noerr immunity would be confined 
severely; a petitioner for governmental action is likely to urge 
that the action is needed to ensure that standards are met, 
thereby suggesting that some entities do not meet appropriate 
standards. 
 3. Direct injury from ABA standards 
 MSL alleges a third injury which occurs directly from 
the ABA's enforcement of its standards, independent of both the 
bar examination and stigma issues.  The challenged standards 
relate to faculty salaries (MSL charges price-fixing) and 
limitations on accredited schools accepting transfers or graduate 
students from unaccredited schools (MSL charges a boycott).  
Although the ABA is immune from liability attributable to the 
state action in requiring applicants for the bar examination to 
have graduated from an ABA-accredited law school and from any 
stigma injury resulting from the denial of accreditation under 
the Noerr petitioning doctrine, the ABA is not immune in the 
actual enforcement of its standards.  The state action relates to 
the use of the results of the accreditation process, not the 
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process itself.  The process is entirely private conduct which 
has not been approved or supervised explicitly by any state.  See 
Midcal, 445 U.S. 97, 100 S.Ct. 937.  Thus, the ABA's enforcement 
of an anticompetitive standard which injures MSL would not be 
immune from possible antitrust liability.  Extending Noerr 
immunity to this type of private activity would run counter to 
Allied Tube. 
 We start our analysis of this direct injury issue by 
pointing out that “to survive [] motion for summary judgment, 
[the plaintiff] must establish that there is a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether [the defendants] entered into an 
illegal conspiracy that caused [the plaintiff] to suffer a 
cognizable injury.”  Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355 (1986).  The 
district court held that MSL did not raise a genuine issue of 
fact as to whether it was injured by the salary, transfer or 
graduate student standards.  MSL, 937 F. Supp. at 441 n.10, 445 
n.20. 
 As we discuss above, MSL failed to show sufficient 
evidence that it was denied accreditation because it did not 
comply with the salary standard.  Therefore, MSL has to show that 
the ABA's alleged fixing of salaries at its accredited schools 
somehow injured it in another way.  At first glance, the argument 
that the ABA's faculty salary standards injured MSL makes no 
economic sense.  As the district court commented, if ABA-
accredited schools are required to pay higher salaries, an 
unaccredited school should have a cost advantage.  See MSL, 937 
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F. Supp. at 441 n.10.  Indeed, it would appear that a conspiracy 
to increase the conspirators' costs would be no more logical than 
would a conspiracy to reduce the conspirators' income.  Cf. Advo, 
Inc. v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1195-1204 
(3d Cir. 1995) (discussing predatory pricing monopoly case).  
Thus, while we consider this appeal on ordinary summary judgment 
standards, we point out that it could be argued that MSL "must 
come forward with more persuasive evidence to support [its] claim 
than would otherwise be necessary."  Matushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 
106 S.Ct. at 1356.   
 MSL alleges that the faculty salary standards injured 
it in two ways.  First, MSL asserts that it raised its salaries 
in an attempt to get accreditation.  This claim is in direct 
conflict to its consistent assertion that it refused to comply 
with the ABA's anticompetitive standards and for that reason was 
denied accreditation.  See, e.g., MSL br. at 3-4.  The claim also 
is remarkable because MSL made it clear that it would not comply 
with ABA standards to obtain certification.  Further, MSL's 
assistant dean testified that MSL salaries have “never been tied 
to” ABA standards.14  App. at 439.  Rather, its dean stated that 
the salary increases were made out of fairness and as a reward 
for hard work.  App. at 393.  The only other related evidence 
shows that MSL acted independently to increase its salaries, and 
then later found that this action might help it get 
                     
     14.     MSL points out that the assistant dean has no role 
in setting MSL's salaries, so he is only giving his personal 
belief on the issue.  MSL reply br. at 30, sup. app. at 5476-79. 
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accreditation.  See app. at 828.  Unsupported allegations to the 
contrary, see app. at 2123, are not sufficient without 
explanation to outweigh the prior testimony and avoid summary 
judgment.  See Hackman v. Valley Fair, 932 F.2d 239, 241 (3d Cir. 
1991); Martin v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 851 F.2d 703, 706 (3d 
Cir. 1988); but see Videon Chevrolet, Inc. v. General Motors 
Corp., 992 F.2d 482, 488 (3d Cir. 1993) (distinguishing Martin 
and holding that statements have to be clearly contradictory and 
without explanation to be insufficient to defeat summary judgment 
motion).  There has not been sufficient explanation of the 
contradiction to create a genuine issue of material fact and 
justify reversing the summary judgment. 
 MSL's second contention that the ABA's salary standards 
injured it is that the standards inflated the market cost of law 
professors, thereby increasing the salaries MSL must pay its 
faculty.  This market price argument is equally unavailing.  
MSL's stated policy was to rely on adjunct faculty.  MSL did not 
produce evidence that any of its faculty other than its dean ever 
had been employed at another law school.  In effect, MSL was 
hiring faculty from a different market, one unaffected by the 
ABA's conduct, or at least a different provider in the same 
market (teachers who never taught at ABA-accredited schools).  
The report by MSL's economic expert does not contradict this 
point, app. at 3568, because it contains only general and 
theoretical observations and is not tied to evidence in the 
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record.15  Thus, we can disregard it for the purposes of 
reviewing the summary judgment.  See Pennsylvania Dental Ass'n v. 
Medical Serv. Ass'n, 745 F.2d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 1984).  Our 
result is supported by MSL's policy towards salaries: “because a 
professor at MSL must prove himself or herself as a full-time 
faculty member before obtaining a large salary, MSL retained a 
level of starting salaries that are below ABA requirements.”  
App. at 2123.16 
 The situation here is analogous to that in Mid-West 
Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573 (3d 
Cir. 1979).  In that case we held that a purchaser from 
competitors of a price-fixer did not have standing to sue the 
price-fixer on the grounds that the general market price 
increased as a result of the price fixing.  Id. at 587.  We 
explained Mid-West Paper in In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore 
Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1167-68 (3d Cir. 1993), where we 
focused on how direct an impact the challenged conduct had on the 
                     
     15.     "[A]s I understand it, MSL was forced to raise its 
salaries to levels above what it would have otherwise (a) in an 
attempt to satisfy the standards and (b) because of the market 
effects of the standards on prices in the input markets.  The 
anticompetitive effects of those practices affect input prices 
(salaries, etc.) for MSL, as well for every other law school.  
The practices injure all of the schools that have accepted the 
standards, as well as those that have not.  Because the standards 
have an undeniable impact on input costs, every school is forced 
to incur higher costs, along with the reduction in the 
flexibility needed to respond efficiently to changing conditions, 
all schools suffer competitive injury as well."  App. at 3568. 
     16.     It is interesting to note that MSL charges that the 
ABA and the AALS engaged in a conspiracy to restrain trade.  It 
thus appears that insofar as the salary standards are concerned, 
MSL believes that the AALS conspired to increase its member law 
schools' costs. 
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plaintiff.  MSL was not impacted directly by the ABA's criteria 
because it was hiring a different kind of professor.  Mid-West 
Paper thus controls, and summary judgment was proper.17 
 MSL also alleges a boycott in that the ABA prevented 
its accredited schools from accepting transfers or graduate 
students from unaccredited schools.  The district court held that 
MSL had not produced any evidence that it was injured by either 
of these rules.  MSL, 937 F. Supp. at 445 n.20.  This holding is 
correct.  MSL has done nothing more than state the standards and 
allege that they injured MSL.  See app. at 2108, 2120.  There is 
no factual support for these allegations.  Further, the evidence 
shows that MSL actively opposed its students transferring, both 
in policy and practice.18  MSL therefore cannot claim that the 
ABA's prohibition on transfers with credit injured it.19 
                     
     17.     This is true even though Mid-West Paper dealt with 
standing and we deal here with whether there is a genuine issue 
of fact as to MSL’s injury, for the concepts are similar.  
     18.     Its dean testified in another proceeding “MSL would 
have [] denied admission had it known [a student] intended to 
seek transfer away as soon as possible.”  App. at 1415.   MSL 
considered transfers to be “extremely harmful to the school,” id. 
at 1416, and that assisting students in transferring was “self-
destructive.”  Id. at 1231.  
     19.     MSL's reliance on the allegations in the 
government's antitrust case which we described above is 
unavailing for two reasons.  First, those allegations never were 
proven because the case was settled, and therefore cannot be 
taken as true in this case.  See United States v. Microsoft 
Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1460-61 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Petruzzi's IGA v. 
Darling-Delaware, 998 F.2d at 1247.  Second, the government never 
alleged that MSL suffered any injury from these standards and 
does not so argue in its amicus brief in this case.  See, e.g., 
DOJ br. at 6-7. 
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 MSL also alleges that the AALS boycotted MSL by 
refusing membership and that the LSAC boycotted MSL by refusing 
to allow it to attend certain recruiting conferences.  See MSL 
br. at 59.  The allegations regarding the AALS are simply 
incorrect.  AALS membership is independent of ABA accreditation, 
and MSL never has applied for such membership.  App. at 2278-80. 
 Even though it is not a member, MSL can attend AALS conferences 
and has done so.  Id. at 2280.  Therefore MSL has not suffered 
any injury at the hands of the AALS. 
 The LSAC's failure to invite MSL to its conferences 
does not constitute a boycott.20  Under the fact-pattern here to 
demonstrate a boycott, MSL has to show that these conferences are 
an essential facility for recruiting students as there is no 
other potential basis for the boycott claim.  Such an essential 
facility or claim fails whenever a plaintiff (1) cannot show that 
the defendant has a monopoly over the alleged essential facility; 
(2) the facility cannot be duplicated in a reasonable manner; and 
(3) the plaintiff has been denied its use.  Ideal Dairy Farms, 
Inc. v. John Labatt, Ltd., 90 F.3d 737, 748 (3d Cir. 1996).  MSL 
has shown only that the LSAC denies it participation.  There is 
no evidence suggesting that the LSAC has a monopoly over access 
to law students or pre-law advisors, or even over recruiting 
fairs.  The LSAC does not hinder MSL's recruiting in any way, it 
                     
     20.     LSAC conferences are only open to LSAC member 
schools.  MSL is not a member of the LSAC because it does not use 
the LSAT and it is not accredited by either the ABA or the AALS. 
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just does not aid it by allowing MSL to attend its conferences.21 
 Such activity is not required by the antitrust laws, and its 
absence does not constitute antitrust injury. 
 Further, MSL has not shown that the LSAC injured it.  
The LSAC never allowed MSL to attend its conferences and, prior 
to ABA accreditation denial, MSL's enrollment exceeded its 
projections.  App. at 2420-24.  It was the denial of 
accreditation which caused MSL’s enrollment to decline, and as 
discussed above, in light of Parker and Noerr that loss cannot be 
the basis for antitrust liability.  MSL contends that as long as 
it was injured in some way by the overall alleged conspiracy, it 
need not show injury from its individual aspects, and cites in 
this respect In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 
F.2d at 1172.  Reply br. at 35.  While this principle is correct, 
it is inapplicable here.  In re Lower Lake Erie did not involve 
state action or petitioning of government immunity issues.  Here, 
MSL must show that it was injured in some way by the ABA's 
enforcement of its standards, independent of any injury from the 
immune state action or petitioning, and as we discuss above, it 
has not done so. 
 Inasmuch as we hold that MSL has failed to demonstrate 
an injury for which antitrust liability may lie, we need go no 
further to affirm the district court's summary judgment order 
with respect to issues beyond those controlled by Parker and 
                     
     21.     Similarly, MSL's claims about getting only a listing 
in The Official Guide to U.S. Law Schools fail because there are 
many such publications, some of which do describe MSL. 
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Noerr.  Thus, we do not consider the district court's alternative 
free speech immunity theory.  Further, we make no comment on 
whether MSL produced sufficient evidence to show the existence of 
a conspiracy for two reasons.22  First, the alleged conspiracy 
with respect to the injuries from the bar examination 
requirements and the stigma from denial of accreditation involved 
immunized conduct.  See Omni, 499 U.S. at 381-84, 111 S.Ct. at 
1354-56.  Second, MSL did not demonstrate that it suffered injury 
from the conduct not immunized.  15 U.S.C. § 15; see Matsushita, 
475 U.S. at 585-86, 106 S.Ct. at 1355; Mathews v. Lancaster Gen. 
Hosp., 87 F.3d at 641; see also Sciambra v. Graham News, 892 F.2d 
411, 414-15 (5th Cir. 1996); United States Football League v. 
National Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1377-78 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 Of course, we hasten to add that we do not hold that if MSL had 
been able to demonstrate injury from conduct beyond the scope of 
Parker and Noerr antitrust immunity there necessarily would be 
liability as we have no need to reach that point.   
 D.  Dismissal of the Individual Appellees 
 The district court dismissed claims against the 22 
individual appellees for lack of personal jurisdiction in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania in an order on March 11, 1994.  
MSL, 846 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Pa. 1994).  The court, upon 
reconsideration and after MSL had conducted some discovery, found 
on May 31, 1994, that MSL could not “suggest, much less show, 
                     
     22.     We do note, however, that there is no probative 
evidence that the AALS or LSAC was involved in any kind of 
conspiracy with the ABA. 
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substantial acts in Pennsylvania.”  MSL, 853 F. Supp. 843, 845 
(E.D. Pa. 1994).  MSL challenges the dismissal on the grounds 
that it was entered before MSL was allowed to undertake any 
discovery as to the appellees' contacts within the district.   
 Our rule is generally that jurisdictional discovery 
should be allowed unless the plaintiff's claim is "clearly 
frivolous."  Nehemiah v. The Athletics Congress, 765 F.2d 42, 48 
(3d Cir. 1985), citing Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee v. 
L’Union Atlantique S.A. D’Assurances, 723 F.2d 357, 362 (3d Cir. 
1983).  The district court found (at least by implication), and  
we agree, that MSL's jurisdictional claims were clearly 
frivolous.  Our result is in accord with other cases which hold 
that a mere unsupported allegation that the defendant “transacts 
business” in an area is “clearly frivolous.”  See Garshman v. 
Universal Resources Holding, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 1359, 1366 
(D.N.J. 1986), aff'd on other grounds, 824 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 
1987);23 see also American Centennial Ins. Co. v. Handal, 901 F. 
Supp. 892, 899 (D.N.J. 1995).  MSL legitimately cannot allege a 
nationwide conspiracy and then say, without more evidence, that 
such a conspiracy must have effects in Pennsylvania. 
 Further, jurisdictional discovery generally relates to 
corporate defendants and the question of whether they are “doing 
business” in the state.  See Compagnie Des Bauxites, 723 F.2d at 
362 and cases cited therein.  Where the defendant is an 
                     
     23.     Garshman was decided on venue grounds, but the 
analysis is the same as for personal jurisdiction.  Garshman, 641 
F. Supp. at 1366. 
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individual, the presumption in favor of discovery is reduced.  
See Shaw v. Boyd, 658 F. Supp. 89, 91 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1987).  Thus, 
the district court's order dismissing the individual appellees 
without ordering discovery first was correct.24 
 E.  Recusal of Judge Ditter 
 MSL made several attempts to have Judge Ditter recused. 
 Judge Ditter denied MSL's recusal motion in an opinion dated 
December 16, 1994.  MSL, 872 F. Supp. 1346 (E.D. Pa. 1994).  
MSL's attempts to seek his recusal in this court were also 
unavailing (one denied, one held moot in light of this appeal).  
Inasmuch as we are affirming the summary judgment, we need not 
consider arguments regarding reassignment on remand.  We review 
the denial of the recusal motion for abuse of discretion. 
 MSL argues that Judge Ditter has both the appearance of 
bias and actual bias, and should be removed from the case under 
either 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) or this court's authority as recognized 
in Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10 F.3d 155, 167 (3d 
Cir. 1993), and Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 98 
(3d Cir. 1992).  The standard for recusal is whether an objective 
observer reasonably might question the judge's impartiality.  MSL 
contends that both one past out-of-court experience, and the bias 
which it asserts is apparent from his rulings, justify Judge 
Ditter's recusal. 
                     
      24.     We note that in view of our merits disposition we 
can conceive of no way that the individual appellees could be 
liable in this case. 
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 MSL argues that Judge Ditter's participation in 1974-75 
on an outside committee which tried to help the Delaware Law 
School, where his son was then a student, obtain ABA 
accreditation justifies recusal.  In over 200 pages of documents 
submitted by MSL relating to Delaware Law School (gleaned from 
depositions and testimony before several courts), Judge Ditter's 
name appears only six times.  This evidence suggests nothing more 
than that Judge Ditter had several meetings with the person who 
was the driving force behind the effort to make changes at 
Delaware Law School in order to qualify for accreditation.  There 
is one affidavit from the former dean of that school that 
suggests that Judge Ditter played a more active role, but Judge 
Ditter, in his careful consideration of the recusal motion, 
sufficiently points out the inconsistencies between this 
declaration and other more contemporaneous testimony.  See MSL, 
872 F. Supp. 1346, 1358-65 (E.D. Pa. 1994).  We thus affirm Judge 
Ditter's holding that nothing related to Delaware Law School 
creates an appearance of bias in this case.  This is true both 
because of Judge Ditter's limited role at the time and the amount 
of time which has passed.  This view is in accord with the 
prevailing case law.  See, e.g., In re Allied Signal, Inc., 891 
F.2d 974, 976 (1st Cir. 1989) (upholding denial of recusal motion 
based on social and business relationship eight years earlier 
between judge and one of plaintiff's attorneys); Alexander v. 
Chicago Park Dist., 773 F.2d 850, 857 (7th Cir. 1985) (denying 
recusal motion based on judge's representation of witness 25 
years earlier). 
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 Furthermore, we do not understand why Judge Ditter's 
participation in the Delaware Law School accreditation process, 
no matter how intensive, would cause an objective observer to 
believe that he would not be impartial here.  The Delaware Law 
School and MSL situations, though somewhat similar in nature, are 
unrelated.  Indeed, it is difficult even to articulate a 
reasonable basis on which to argue that by reason of Judge 
Ditter's experiences regarding the Delaware Law School he would 
have a bias here.  As far as we can see, there is no more basis 
to think that Judge Ditter was not impartial here because of his 
experiences 20 years ago with Delaware Law School, than to 
believe that a judge who had been in an automobile accident would 
not be impartial in a case involving a different accident. 
 MSL also argues that Judge Ditter's rulings, both in 
substance (allegedly always against MSL) and in form (allegedly 
repeatedly vilifying and condemning MSL and its dean), 
demonstrate actual bias.  Since we have affirmed several of the 
rulings MSL contends demonstrate bias, and a review of the record 
shows that there was no pattern of consistently ruling against 
MSL, there is no actual bias.   
 We also point out that a judge's consistent pattern of 
ruling against a party could be entirely justified for that party 
might consistently be taking positions that cannot be supported. 
 Even-handed justice does not require a judge to balance 
numerically the rulings in favor of and against each party.  
After all, each ruling stands on its own.  Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court has said that “judicial rulings alone almost never 
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constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.”  
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1157 
(1994).25  We do not believe that a reasonable person who looked 
at Judge Ditter's rulings objectively would find the appearance 
of bias.  See United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1413 (3d 
Cir. 1994).  It should be apparent to anyone that he worked 
diligently in this hard-fought case and, as far as we are 
concerned, reached the correct outcome. 
 We also do not find that any of Judge Ditter's comments 
cited by MSL, see MSL br. at 23-25, suggest the appearance of 
partiality.  The Liteky Court held that “judicial remarks during 
the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or 
even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily 
do not support a bias or partiality challenge.”  510 U.S. at 555, 
114 S.Ct. at 1157; see also In re Skobinsky, 167 B.R. 45, 52 
(E.D. Pa. 1994).  MSL's desire to impute hostile intent to Judge 
Ditter does not mean he had that intent, and does not create an 
appearance of bias.  MSL's attitude appears to be that anyone who 
disagrees with it is both wrong and biased, but the evidence does 
not show this.  The cases cited by MSL are inapplicable because 
they dealt with unique extrajudicial contact with a party, In re 
Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1992), an implicit 
admission of bias by the judge, In re Antar, 71 F.3d 97, 101 (3d 
Cir. 1995), or reassignment on remand, Haines and Alexander.  
Since this case will not be remanded, we need not consider 
                     
     25.     The holding in Liteky required bias to stem from an 
“extrajudicial source” to support a recusal under section 455(a). 
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reassignment and, as we discussed, Judge Ditter's denial of the 
recusal motion was not an abuse of discretion. 
 F.  Disqualification of Inside Counsel 
 MSL also appeals the district court's disqualification 
of five members of MSL’s administration and faculty from serving 
as trial counsel, giving oral argument, and taking depositions.26 
 Since MSL does not allege that it received incompetent counsel, 
and we are affirming the summary judgment order, the issue 
probably is moot.  In any event, the court did not err in 
requiring the disqualification. 
 
 III. CONCLUSION 
 The order of the district court entered August 29, 
1996, granting the appellees summary judgment and the other 
orders on appeal will be affirmed. 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
     26.     By agreement among the parties, this order later was 
modified to allow two of the MSL professors to act as trial 
counsel.  MSL br. at 29 n.12. 
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